






# BankSealer: Fast and Transparent Online Banking Fraud Detection and Investigation

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Joint work with: Michele Carminati, Stefano Zanero, Ilenia Epifani




### **Internet Banking**



#### Online and mobile banking


% of internet users who do online banking vs. the % of cell phone owners who use mobile banking



**Source:** Pew Research Center's Internet & American Life Tracking and Omnibus Surveys, 2000-2013. Margin of error for results based on internet users is +/- 2.5 percentage points and +/- 3.8 percentage points for results based on cell phone owners.

## Growth of Internet banking services

### **Internet Banking**




Banking malware

Growth of Internet banking services



Increase of online banking frauds and financial malware attacks

### **Internet Banking**



Growth of Internet banking services




Increase of online banking frauds and financial malware attacks



Need to create up-to-date defense infrastructures

### **Anatomy of a Fraud**



#### Main threats

#### **Traditional threats:**


- Phishing
- Credentials Database Theft

#### **Banking Trojans**


Malware that aims at stealing banking credentials in order to perform online financial frauds:

- ZeuS (2007+)
- SpyEye (2011+)
- Citadel (2012+)
- Carberp (2014+)

### **Anatomy of a Fraud**



### **Web Injections**




### Effect of a web injection



### Effect of a web injection





### **Banking Fraud Detection: Challenges**

Internet banking frauds are difficult to analyze and detect:

- Fraudulent behavior is dynamic and dispersed in large and highly imbalanced datasets with different customers
- Scarcity of available informations and data
- Most of the existing approaches:
  - Black box
  - Based on synthetic data
  - Not adaptive baseline profiling

### **Existing approaches & market offer**

Fraud detection is a wide research topic

- Main focus: credit cards
  - Both in literature and in the market
- Most of the existing approaches:
  - Black box:
    - Instead, analysts need an explanation for the results
    - Tiring manual investigation and confirmation
  - Not adaptive:
    - CC frauds are assumed to be "always the same" across the world

### **BankSealer: Goals**

- Not focus on pure detection approach
- Support the analysis and the investigation of (novel) frauds and anomalies through readable model and results
- Decision support system able to model user behavior and its evolution

#### **Publications**

If you wish to check the publications during or after the talk:

Michele Carminati, Roberto Caron, Federico Maggi, Ilenia Epifani, Stefano Zanero, "<u>BankSealer: An Online Banking</u> <u>Fraud Analysis and Decision Support System</u>", in IFIP SEC 2014

Michele Carminati, Roberto Caron, Federico Maggi, Ilenia Epifani, Stefano Zanero, "BankSealer: A decision support system for online banking fraud analysis and investigation", Computers & Security, vol. 53, Sept. 2015, pp. 175–186

### **Original Dataset**


- Three months, one of the largest banks in Italy
- Skewed and unbalanced distribution of the attribute values
- High cardinality
- Majority of users perform only few transactions

	# Transactions	# Users		
<b>Bank Transfers</b>	371,137	47,650		
<b>Prepaid phone</b>	54,141	16,093		
<b>Debit cards</b>	34,986	8,415		

### **Anonymized Dataset**

IP	Timestamp	Туре	Amount	t User ID	IBAN		Country
3d64e9f4a188aa034659d1409f90456a	08/feb/2013 21:06:30	Giroconto	20000	dcfc15d4d65e05ebafde6ac9383062aa	e6c2a617f55090de28a24c67dfbedf40	-	IT
99ca402ce2299ecd72e2ebe269b5d35f	06/feb/2013 19:28:26	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	9900	4a4ee6e2ac1b17e20958ad7a8221c1b4	11e6c83f92f065b07763f0beb451dd1a	/	IT
ef7478c757b1fbe74bfbc21d1210051d	06/feb/2013 20:07:26	Giroconto	3000	e5d50d08b275cd98fb853ae6351c9fb9	11df01951ac12b1809feb39b81853fcf	/	IT
91dfd27a9e1352963f8442edaa477c82	15/feb/2013 14:28:10	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	22000	aa838ae340aa33fb774164f9a9985194	5ca5ba919c59ff70c5d522cc5fc97b61	/	IT
86419f50fbda2742c1dba87cd3429470	28/feb/2013 17:46:46	Giroconto	12000	492ee7251c425c36c82cd3241c563f79	484fe271f1804b3e4291a537bb65279a	/	IT
dd5d85da0532104875e18e4e32bc152c	08/feb/2013 16:11:24	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	3863.29	a6f088c1fae1085def1308e532082cb7	73b5047423c9dad3b2601c929e2cece7	1	IT
cd002daddde353900cc24e4ffc3b235c	21/feb/2013 18:40:02	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	5643	a7b7a36b2769a1be86d1a544b67007a9	2626bfbc3376dababb639201c9b8ff67	/	IT
0bdda3afaf28f049483d89d53f021c11	25/feb/2013 09:36:12	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	31000	be2b61118c081429cfbbc0c3d948743b	831687c224f781f106604f984e14f414	1	IT
2aeddb8850ae946914285eb3bcd28d55	04/feb/2013 16:42:53	Giroconto	10000	41efb45d969e9511b7df6504840cc572	40c200429a2c2a4c7268b3300681e5e3	/	IT
70c765c7265d92f96a05d91eebb4eb64	28/feb/2013 19:04:37	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	6529.6	8b7ed02e24a297a7ad7b91d28a5b35e1	3ada9624925ed42838bd4b8fab9eae81	Х	IT
d00d1939b4f71eaa199a57fff9cf0c19	20/feb/2013 14:59:10	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	9bc3d0e6065284891a42ce6f9d828c38	65ecb9d1169b23049ec018d31c27af0a	Х	IT
2c2c6f325c547ee1fb0efc01475bc7d6	14/feb/2013 09:17:53	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	/	PT
ba3664bb7ebbf9e8bf4ac0664d65e239	10/feb/2013 19:21:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	20000	2a17ed71d9e2c82f39e174e424bf7eb9	e9987193889c72a6dcb94bbd47e35699	Х	IT
d7ab9d7839eb60ff6e606c496e1c848a	08/feb/2013 19:23:46	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	25266.8	435b8226966d2fb40d52bafd6aaa8a93	92a91621f34b668401e8c26050f4e0c6	Х	IT
6da1465327246224216c1c929c339c6f	18/feb/2013 15:09:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	/	PT

### Skewed data example



#### **Attributes**

\$\$\$ CC.IP IP IBAN CC\_IBAN D:H:M:S


PHONE RECAHRGES

\$\$\$ CC.IP IP OP.TEL NUM.TEL D:H:M:S

PREPAID CARDS


\$\$\$ CARD\_TYPE CARD.NR CC\_IP D:H:M:S

#### **Model for Each Attribute**





VALUES FOR ATTRIBUTE "X" (or CATEGORIES)

### **Model Example**





### **HBOS** = Histogram Based Outlier Score








$$HBOS(t) = \sum_{\mathbf{0} < i \leq d} w_i * \log \frac{1}{f(t_i)}; \qquad \sum_{\mathbf{0} < i \leq d} w_i = 1$$





























#### Users with scarce data: Global Profile


#### Two phases:

- 1. **Clustering:** find groups of *similar* users
  - a. **Algorithm:** incremental DBSCAN
  - b. **Distance function:** Mahalanobis
- 2. **Anomaly score:** *distance* of a user from the large clusters











# **Majority of Users Behave Similarly**



# **Majority of Users Behave Similarly**




	index	IP	Timestamp	TipoOperazione	Importo	UserID	j	IBAN	Numero Conferma SMS	IBAN_CC	CC_ASN	HBOS locale	Undertrained	New User
1	92580	3d64e9f4a188aa034659d1409f90456a	08/feb/2013 21:06:30	Giroconto	20000	dcfc15d4d65e05ebafc	de6ac9383062aa	e6c2a617f55090de28a24c67dfbedf40	~	IT	IT,8612	29.402365073	•	х
2	01133	Qqca402ce22QQecd72e2ehe26Qh5d35f	06/feb/2013	Bonifici per detrazione	9900	1a1ee6e2ar1h17e200	358ad7a8221c1b4	11e6c83f92f065b0777	,	IT	IT 3269	27 0032775111		Х
3	3c9	9dad3b2601c929e2ce	ece7	1		IT I	IT,30722	24.5660880611			Х	6475914 6765096		×
5	101355	86419f50fbda2742c1dba87cd3429478	28/feb/2013 17:46.46	Giroconto	12000	) 49zee7251cA25c36c8	82cd3241c563f79	484fe271f1804b3e4291a537bb65279a	,	ΙΤ	IT,44957	25.0995700682	(	X
6	92502	2 dd5d85da0532104875e18e4e32bc152c	08/feb/2013 16:11:24	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	3863.29	a6f989c1fae1085def1	1308e532082cb7	73b5047423c9dad3b2601c929e2cece7	1	IT	IT,30722	24.5660880611	1	X
7	99074	cd002daddde353900cc24e4ffc3b235c	21/feb/2013 18:40:02	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	5643	a7b7a36b2769a1be86	3d1a544b67007a9	2626bfbc3376dababb639201c9b8ff67	1	IT	IT,21056	24.4493640116		Х
8	99827	7 Obdda3afaf28f049483d89d53f021c11	25/feb/2013 09:36:12	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	31000	be2b61118c081429cfb	bbc0c3d948743b	831687c224f781f106604f984e14f414	1	IT	IT,12874	24.4175445119	•	Х
9	89586	2aeddb8850ae946914285eb3bcd28d55	04/feb/2013 16:42:53	Giroconto	10000	41efb45d969e9511b7	7df6504840cc572	40c200429a2c2a4c7268b3300681e5e3	1	)IT	IT,12874	23.6879134642	2	×
10	101627	7 70c765c7265d92f96a05d91eebb4eb64	28/feb/2013 19:04:37	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	6529.6	8b7ed02e24a297a7ac	d7b91d28a5b35e1	3ada9624925ed42838bd4b8fab9eae81	х	IT	IT,50809	23.6370584204	4	X
11	98401	d00d1939b4f71eaa199a57fff9cf0c19	20/feb/2013 14:59:10	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	9bc3d0e6065284891a	a42ce6f9d828c38	65ecb9d1169b23049ec018d31c27af0a	х	IT	IT,3269	23.5882551789	•	Х
12	95342	2 2c2c6f325c547ee1fb0efc01475bc7d6	14/feb/2013 09:17:53	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8	3bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	/	PT	IT,16232	23.5439265229	• •	1
13	92842	2 ba3664bb7ebbf9e8bf4ac0664d65e239	10/feb/2013 19:21:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	20000	2a17ed71d9e2c82f39	Je174e424bf7eb9	e9987193889c72a6dcb94bbd47e35699	х	IT	IT,3269	23.5233646465	•	×
14	92551	d7ab9d7839eb60ff6e606c496e1c848a	08/feb/2013 19:23:46	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	25266.8	435b8226966d2fb40d	d52bafd6aaa8a93	92a91621f34b668401e8c26050f4e0c6	х	IT	IT,3269	23.4602697196	S .	х
15	97221	6da1465327246224216c1c929c339c6f	18/feb/2013 15:09:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8	8bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	1	PT	IT,16232	23.2738702047	~	/

Rischio	Info	Importo	Utente	IP	IBAN	Operazione	Data
••••		10900€	Mike Gill	51.11.1.1	RO49 AAAA 1B31 0075 93 84 0000	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
Utent	e poco attiv	⁄o 560€	Bruce Carroll	59.05.21.0	IT40 3456 5678 4567 34567 0909 987	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••••	<u>.</u> !	1010€	Kate Wilkerson	55.01.09.11	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••••		1600€	Jordan Powers	151.01.11.02	DE85 3703 0044 0053 2013 00	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••••	≛*	1030€	Floyd Houston	163.01.11.08	IT40 5054 2811 1010 10000 0123 456	Giroconto	02/10/2015
•••	≛!	2010€	Jay Walton	152.01.11.23	IT40 5054 2811 1010 10000 0123 456	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•••		1400€	Abbie Barnes	62.01.11.20	IT40 5054 2811 1010 10000 0123 456	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•••	<b>≛</b> !	1300€	Mina Harvey	72.01.11.10	IT40 5054 2811 1010 10000 0123 456	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•••	≛*	1100€	Charles Beck	72.01.11.10	Filtra per questo elemento 🖸 🔓	Giroconto	02/10/2015
••		90€	Stanley Morales	102.01.11.10	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••		1130€	Antonio Griffith	102.01.11.10	IT40 3456 5678 4567 34567 0909 987	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
**		140€	Jordan Powers	101.01.11.10	IT40 3456 5678 4567 34567 0909 987	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••		110€	William Peters	14.01.11.10	IT40 5054 2811 1010 10000 0123 456	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••		34€	Iva Rodgers	103.02.11.10	DE85 3703 0044 0053 2013 00	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
••		21€	Hester Taylor	65.01.11.21	IT40 3456 5678 4567 34567 0909 987	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
Nuc	ovo utente	678€	Jorge Hopkins	58.01.12.1	DE85 3703 0044 0053 2013 00	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•	ž+	43€	Emilie Erickson	14.01.11.10	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•		789€	Albert Jenkins	62.01.11.20	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•		56€	Jesus Reeves	72.01.11.10	DE85 3703 0044 0053 2013 00	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•		98€	Beulah Brady	152.01.11.23	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015
•		2356€	Max Kim	163.01.11.08	IT17 X060 5502 1000 0000 1234 567	Bonifico Italia e SEPA	02/10/2015




## **Fraud Analysis**






## **Feature Weighting & Detection**




#### **Dataset Generation**

Generate synthetic frauds based on scenarios built with the collaboration of bank experts that replicate the typical real attacks performed against online banking users



Inject **n fraudulent transactions (or users)** in the testing dataset and analyze the top **n transactions (or users)** in the ranking


## **Detection Capabilities**




For comparison, best result in **state of the art**: Wei et al. (2013) report detecting **60-70%** of the frauds with unreported precision

## With Genetic Algorithms

	TPR	Weighted	TPR	Improvement
Mixed scenario	58%	81%		+23%



## **Resource Requirements: Training**



#### **Time Performance: Runtime**

	# Transactions	# Users		
<b>Bank Transfers</b>	371,137	47,650		
<b>Prepaid phone</b>	54,141	16,093		
<b>Debit cards</b>	34,986	8,415		

Domain	Timespan of Data	Runtime	
Bank Transfers	1 day	1–4 min	
Dalik Hallstels	1 month	6–93 min	
Dronaid nhana	1 day	18–25 sec	
Prepaid phone	1 month	0.5-2.5 min	
Dobit couds	1 day	7–10 sec	
Debit cards	1 month	12–60 sec	

Note: ranges are for "only well trained" and "including undertrained" users.







Banking Fraud Detection and Investigation

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