What we Know About EyePyramid

Published on: January 18, 2017

TL;DR: Two Italian brothers have been arrested for planting and managing a long-running malware operation to spy on several high-profile politicians and businesspersons. In this post, I give my side of the investigation.

The day before the EyePyramid case exploded, I received a confidential email with a PDF. It was the scanned copy of the court order for the law enforcement to proceed and arrest the Occhionero brothers. In a few minutes, I noticed that this leaked document was also circulating on various private mailing lists and chat groups I’m part of. At some point, I received a non-redacted copy.

I typically do not work on e-crime investigation cases, but while reading the court order I felt that something was not completely right. Moreover, the case was in Italy, my home country, which motivated me to look at it. Then, some colleagues from Trend Micro Italy contacted me with questions coming from our clients (for which, back then, I couldn’t answer yet). So, at the end of the day I decided to dive in!

Puzzling Facts in the Court Order

I skimmed through the court order and was surprised by the vast amount of technical evidence provided to support the accusations. Email addresses (in clear or easy to guess when redacted), IP addresses, domain names. So detailed that I could basically write a Yara rule to hunt for malware samples, without even looking at a single binary.

And then, the part that puzzled me most. The author of the malware used a licensed software library and allegedly purchased the license under the name of Giulio Occhionero (one of the two brothers). It’s like, leaving your name on the crime scene!

(Almost) Live Reversing

After getting my hands on some samples (yes, with Yara hunting rules based on the court order), things escalated quickly, and found myself looking at nearly 250 samples. With the help of my fine colleagues, we’ve drawn rough, big picture of the whole scheme and started to find confirmatory evidence.

In a few hours, people on Twitter and other social networks started to follow the case closely, comment on it, give their own views. Given some confusion, I felt the urge to publish a list of “cold, simple, yet true” technical facts. So I’ve spun up a GitHub Gist (now deleted), which then evolved in a full repository (now not updated anymore), and finally a post on Medium (in Italian). Results were popping up rapidly, so I found myself unable to keep up with the pace, and decided to stop “live reversing” the samples, set aside some time and prepare two comprehensive posts for TrendLab’s Intelligence Blog, which my employer was very happy to release in no time.

Summary of the Case

On the one hand, the original source code had gone through only very mild modifications (e.g., not all variants are able to exfiltrate Skype conversations, C&C and dropzones, compiler version, and protection mechanisms). On the other hand, the computer(s) used to build the various versions over the years seemed to be in line with the evolution of Microsoft developer tools (based on the progression of the compiler version) and software-protection tools (as seen on the recent substitution of Skater plus Dotfuscator with the more powerful ConfuserEx). This indicates that the actors behind this operation knew what they were doing. Of course, this was (and still) far from being an advanced or targeted piece of malware.

Apart from this, the origins of EyePyramid’s malware and its attribution remain a mystery. While the license key registered to Giulio Occhionero’s name can be considered as strong evidence, it is unclear why a malware author would bother using (simple yet not so trivial) mechanisms to cover their traces (e.g., obfuscation, packing, encryption, disabling security tools), and then mistakenly embed the license key under his name in all of the main variants. Moreover, an analysis of the domain-to-IP historical data of the domain names listed in the court order reveals domains named occhionero.com and occhionero.info, which is again another oddity.

Latest Update (Just Another Oddity)

I received an unexpected email message from someone I’ve never heard before. Despite the author of this email is not known in the cyber security community (he presented himself as a PhD Student in medicine at Stanford), he took the time (and money) to verify every single email address written in my analysis and in the court order.

Using LeakedSource (now taken down) he had found that one of the compromised email addresses (lu_1974[@]hotmail.com, which is linked to EyePyramid) was used to register on various dating sites. LeakedSource was borderline websites that hosted stolen information, including usernames and passwords.

“this is probably just a coincidence” he said but “Giulio also used his @westlands.com address to register to the same dating sites.”

Anyways, I’ve replied back, thanking him for his work. Then I’ve asked him why a Stanford PhD Student in medicine was so interested in such “niche” case (unfolded from the other side of the world), and how he knew that Giulio Occhionero had used his @westlands.com address to register to the same dating sites, because I could not find any evidence about it

I’ve never gotten a reply.

Media

After getting in touch with Carola Frediani, who did a very good job consolidating all the facts for La Stampa (Tutti i dettagli e i misteri di EyePyramid), I happily joined the hacker’s corner at the International Journalism Festival 2017 in Perugia, a few months later, in a panel moderated by Carola. Here’s the recording of the panel.

#malware #espionage #italy #trendmicro